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Introduction
In January 2010, Coralis I. Cocepcion, a Rhode Island resident and mother of three, saw
her government cash assistance of $585 per month end, in the midst of a global financial
meltdown and even though her economic situation remained as troubling as ever. She said she
had to applied to over 200 jobs in the past year but had no success in finding one. Ms.
Concepcion expressed her frustration: “It’s very difficult to find any job…I am competing
against people with bachelors and masters degrees. I went to high school through the 10th
grade”.1
Ms. Concepcion is one of hundreds of thousands of individuals and families in the United
States who have been affected by the Great Recession and are experiencing the thinness of social
safety nets. The assistance she received was from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), a welfare program funded by the federal and state government to provide financial aid
to indigent families with dependent children. In 1996 TANF succeeded the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program as the nation’s main support for needy families, but in the
process it fundamentally weakened the way government related to low-income communities. In
the decades prior to the 1996 reform, AFDC was not seen as an act of charity but as plan for
poverty reduction that was necessary for societal improvements. TANF changed the focus of this
welfare program from helping those in need to preventing recipients from swindling the system.
The reform was based on the conservative pillar that government assistance to the poor creates
dependency and requirements limits. Severely reducing benefits with the creation of TANF was
supposed to provide an incentive for low income families to leave welfare programs. Proponents
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of TANF argued that low-income communities were fully responsible for their fate and needed
to change their immoral behavior to improve their circumstances.
However, seventeen years after the reform we have seen a worsening of the
socioeconomic situation in the United States. Poverty has risen, inequality has widened, social
mobility occurs at glacial pace, and TANF benefits are at their lowest rates. For most of the
twentieth century, AFDC/TANF caseloads were directly related to poverty: an increase in
poverty rates would cause the increase of the AFDC/TANF caseloads. But after the 1996
legislation, the relationship was decoupled and now the welfare caseload declines regardless of
the number of people who need it. These trends were magnified by the global economic collapse
in 2007. Families like Ms. Concepcion’s do not need an incentive to leave poverty but rather an
opportunity to do so. TANF has failed to provide such opportunities. Moreover, TANF has not
met its advocates’ promises for improving the lives of Americans yet many politicians and voters
still argue that we need to continue down this path.
This thesis will analyze the history of AFDC/TANF, evaluate the recent reforms and take
into consideration public opinion and political constraints to propose sensible changes to this
welfare program that will improve its current decrepit state. The first chapter will analyze the
history of AFDC/TANF from its inception in 1935 up to its reform in 1996. In this chapter, I
will divide this broad swathe of U.S. history into four periods. In each, I will analyze the
political, economic and cultural struggles to determine who is “worthy” of government aid and
evaluate the legislative developments that occurred during each epoch. The second chapter will
examine the welfare reform of 1996 and its reauthorization in 2005 as well as assess both of their
effects on American society. I make it clear that continuing TANF under the current
circumstance will only exasperate the decay of low income communities. Chapter 3 focuses on

6
the role of public opinion on the welfare debate and why TANF has received a negative
reputation around the country. It will also convey how demographic factors such as income,
party identification, race, and educational attainment affect public opinion of the program.
Furthermore, I will use this chapter to examine what “welfare” means to the average American
and how that has been framed by the history of welfare. Finally, in Chapter 4 I make policy
recommendations on how to improve TANF to alleviate poverty in the United States. This
proposal will take into account the political momentum that conservatives have on this field but
also address the legislative analysis that has been conducted on the topic.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the many shortcomings of the 1996 welfare
reform and suggest recommendations that will address them and can serve to improve the way
the United States addresses poverty domestically. Within this goal, the thesis will have to explain
the cognitive dissonance that many Americans hold towards TANF: they wish to help the poor
but disapprove of welfare programs that the poor need. Only by understanding the program’s
past, recognizing its current problems, and identifying its political and electoral roots is it
possible to improve the deplorable state of low-income communities in the United States.
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Chapter 1: Historical Analysis of Welfare
The New Deal Era (1900s-1940)
The Origins of the New Deal
The origins of welfare in the United States can be traced back several centuries to
religious organizations, poor laws, charities, and workhouses in Europe. Some of these
institutions were present during the settlement of the thirteen colonies while other migrated
across the Atlantic in subsequent decades. One of the most influential factors to American
welfare from the European establishment was the Elizabethan Poor Laws. These laws went into
effect in the early seventeenth century in England under the rule of Queen Elizabeth and were
created to alleviate the poverty within the kingdom. Most importantly, they made a distinction
between the “worthy poor” who included the “lame, impotent, old, blind, and such other among
them being Poor, and not able to work” from the “unworthy poor” who were of meager means
but of able body.2 The poor laws were also “for setting to work all such persons, married or
unmarried, having no Means to maintain them [their children]”.3 The principles of
distinguishing between the categories of poor as well as the essential elements of labor found in
the Elizabethan Poor Laws continue to be a central part of the welfare debate. With this in mind
it is necessary to fast forward to the beginning of the twentieth century to better map the
development of welfare policy in the United States.
Similar to their Elizabethan counterparts, American policymakers at the start of the 1900s
had in their jurisdiction a significant portion of the population living in poverty. Records show
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that from 1900 to 1930, 60 percent of Americans lived without sufficient access to food, shelter,
clothing, and clean water.4 Small farmers and farmworkers in the rural parts of the country were
often considered to be the face of poverty early in this period. However, as the country
industrialized and urban centers expanded, single mothers would become particularly exposed to
financial hardship due to the tens of thousands of work accidents that took the lives of men every
year5 leaving them widows.6 While all low-income single women suffered economic hardship
and withstood the appalling working conditions, African American women suffered greater
adversity since racism hindered their employability. The issues plaguing poor single mothers
caught national attention as they began unionizing and forming organizations such as the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the National Association of Colored Women.7
Nevertheless, it was middle-class white female activists such as Jane Addams who had a voice in
shaping policy regarding poverty among single women.
Historians have labeled the advocacy stemming from the previously mentioned groups as
“maternalist.”8 This view has at its center the belief that a women’s place is at home being a
mother and raising her children. Addams states that “the long hours of factory labor necessary
for earning the support of a child leave no time for the tender care and caressing which may
enrich the life of the most piteous baby.”9 Based on this view, maternalist advocates did not
pressure the government to improve the circumstance of female workers or alleviate the plight of
combining work and parenthood. Instead, they argued for a pension so mothers could exit the
labor force and be reinstalled in their rightful place: in the home caring for their children. Illinois
4
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was the first state to pass a mother’s pension law in 1911 and 36 states would follow it over a
span of six years.10 Activists and politicians saw these gains as a legal recognition of the
importance of women’s domestic role in society and that the pensions were “salaries earned by
mothers who serve the state in giving all their time to rearing good citizens.”11 Single mothers
became part of the “worthy poor” and were able to legitimately receive financial assistance from
the government. It is this redefinition of worth that would grant them a place during the New
Deal reforms.
The Social Security Act of 1935
During his third year in office, President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed the Social
Security Act on August 14th of 1935. The congressional election of 1934 had given FDR’s
Democratic Party greater control of both Congressional houses and assured the passing of the
president’s plan. The Act was meant to “provide for the general welfare… and by enabling the
several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and
crippled children, maternal and child welfare” as well as assist in the immediate relief of those
suffering from the Great Depression.12
It was due to the political gains that women had made through mothers’ pension laws that
they were able to crystallize their ideals in the New Deal. The Aid for Dependent Children
(ADC) program was created as a legislative equal to the Aid to the Blind and the Old Age
Assistance Programs making single mothers exempt from the duty of wage earning, just as it did

10
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for senior and disabled citizens.13 Although FDR had called welfare a “narcotic” that was the
“subtle destroyer of the human spirit” in his State of Union Address in 1935, it seems to only
have been a political maneuver to gain support for an expansion of government projects.14 The
president had already established his commitment to welfare earlier in the speech by declaring
that laws from Congress should address: “security of livelihood, security against major
hazardous and vicissitudes of life, and security of a decent home.”15 The Social Security Act and
the creation of the ADC program contributed towards guaranteeing such safety.
ADC was to be the liaison between the government and needy children. The Act
determined that a child would be considered “dependent” if he or she was under sixteen years of
age and had been “deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent.”16 The new definition for dependent
children and the inability for counties to drop out of the program (like they had with mother’s
pension laws) created wider coverage for low income families. The program also expanded from
covering widows to virtually all poor women who had no male breadwinners.
However, the legislative text conveying the financial structure of the program would
prove to be troubling in the near future. For example, Congress committed itself in the Social
Security Act to appropriate “for each fiscal year thereafter a sum sufficient to carry out the
purposes of this title [ADC]” and thereby assuring that the program would be properly funded
and adjusted to the need of the given year.17 However, it is the vagueness of the word
“sufficient” that will assist members of Congress who were unfriendly to the program in
13
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minimizing its size. Similarly, the fact that the states would only be reimbursed for one-third of
the cost of the program allowed them to keep a great deal of discretion on the distribution of
funds.18
Drawbacks
The Social Security Act is among the few pieces of legislation that is still active as of the
time of this writing. Although amendments have been made, it is considered to be one of the
most successful legacies of the New Deal. Nevertheless, the Act did have some shortcomings
and exasperated particular issues of the time. When creating the ADC program, the law states
that only children will be considered for the calculation of the grants and their caretakers needed
to find their own method of survival.19 This measure was paradoxical since the purpose of the
program was for single mothers not to abandon their homes in search of income yet it did not
account for them when dispensing financial assistance.
States were also reimbursed for their ADC expenditure at a much lower rate than
unemployment insurance as well as aid provided to the blind and elderly. This system reflected
the belief that ADC was equal to the other programs when it came to written legislation, but
society was not accepting of its beneficiaries. The program became particularly stigmatized
when Congress passed an amendment to the Social Security Act on 1939. The change was
motivated by hopes of administrative efficiency that had been recommended by the President’s
Committee on Economic Security on 1935 but was not implemented at the time.20 This
amendment syphoned off widows from ADC and placed them under the Old-Age and Survivors
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Insurance. The restructuring left mainly divorced, deserted and never married women in ADC,
all which were looked down upon by society (opinions about these groups will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3). At this point, the Social Security Act preserved a “two-channel”
system of government assistance: one provided generous and respectable financial aid to white
male workers while the other was a stigmatized program that provided assistance to an
undesirable type of needy Americans.21 Rather than expanding the program to cover African
Americans or agricultural workers who were excluded from the original version of the Social
Security Act, Congress’ alteration to ADC created a program that was an easy target for criticism
due to the contempt citizens felt towards its recipients.
The Post-War Reaction (1950s)
At the Federal Level
As World War II came to an end in 1945 Congress began to refocus its attention on
domestic issues. Nevertheless, the war years and the need for female labor by the defense
industry had left its mark. While politicians and the public condemned women leaving their child
rearing and home keeping duties for a professional job, policymakers expanded public child care
services (first locally and then at a national level) to provide children with a safe space during
their mother’s work shift.22 The wages were often below subsistence but were an improvement
from nothing.
At the same time, when the war ended to 1950 the number of families that were ADC
recipients had doubled but the median time spent in the program (2.1 years) stayed virtually the

21
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same.23 Although women still had a restricted role in society, households headed by women went
from 2.5 million in 1940 to 4.4 million in 1960.24 This national trend was caused by a
combination a high death rate among males from combat abroad (World War II, Korean War,
and Vietnam War), high desertion rates by males, and relatively better possibilities for women to
survive without a husband (through government aid and participation in the paid labor force).25
Furthermore, African Americans who had historically been denied access to social safety nets,
began entering some programs but would often obtain a fraction of what their white counterparts
received (an amount already below subsistence levels).26 As the 1950s came to a close, ADC was
becoming the largest and most costly federal public assistance program primarily because of the
demographic changes and social acceptance discussed above.
In attempt to slow down the growth of welfare, conservative members of Congress used
strong anticommunist rhetoric claiming that social policies were of Marxian origin. However, the
expansion of the program was necessary due to the previously noted social changes as well as a
countercyclical economic measure during the 1948, 1953 and 1957 recessions in the United
States.27 Moreover, ADC opponents in Congress seemed to believe that not all welfare was
created equal: legislation to expand government financial assistance to returning veterans easily
passed Congress while single mothers enrolled in ADC were held in their contempt. Welfare
opponents created a disjointed argument in which government assistance given to single mothers

23
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in ADC would lead to communism yet equally generous aid could be disbursed to military
personnel without repercussion.
After much debate since the end of the war, there was a greater consensus in Congress
about government assistance to low-income communities. The rhetoric in Washington changed
from helping the needy to allowing government to rehabilitate the poor from their “social
disabilities” (such as being immature and having a dependent personality) that inhibited their full
potential.28 This modification in the welfare argument partially shifted the locus of responsibility
for poverty away from the individual and into societal and biological agents, thereby justifying
government intervention. This change in rationalization helped pass a provision in 1950 to count
children’s caretakers when calculating the aid allocated to families. By 1952, policymakers
decided to make the qualification for ADC assistance less restrictive and agreed to pay for a
wider percentage of the total cost of welfare.29 President Eisenhower created the Department
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) a year later as a way to consolidate the power of several
government agencies as well as give these vital issues a primary position in the presidential
cabinet. Nevertheless, the change in rhetoric also began shifting the focus of ADC from assisting
children to rehabilitating mothers. This change in beliefs would solidify into policy by amending
the Social Security Act in 1956 to state that the purpose of ADC was to “improve family life.”30
At the State Level
While the federal government was implementing laws to make sure that the needy
receive proper assistance, many state legislatures were attempting to restrict such aide. The
national ADC caseload increased overall but the growth and quality of benefits varied among
28
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regions. The South and Midwest regions had some of the strictest rules but many Western and
Northeastern states were in certain respects not far behind.
Individual states would often underfund welfare programs in order to make an increasing
number of recipients survive with far fewer resources. In 1950, California provided ADC
recipients with over four times more cash assistance than Alabama ($28.40 versus $6.54
respectively).31 Underfunding would also occur indirectly as the value of ADC’s financial
assistance was eroded by inflation. This was the case for Florida when it did not change the
state’s monetary allocation to ADC from 1951 to 1963, allowing for benefits to devalue by
almost 20 percent. Other states preferred to attach draconian conditions to their welfare
assistance. In 1952, Georgia’s welfare board decided that public administrators could force
women to work in accordance with the “habits and customs prevalent in the community” to
receive their welfare assistance.32 Many states quickly copied this policy causing places like
Tallulah, Mississippi to make girls as young as six collect 100 to 200 pounds of cotton a day.33
One of the most exclusionary tactics used to limit the benefits of potential ADC
recipients were “suitable home” laws (also known as the “man-in-the-house” rules). This state
legislation had different meanings depending on its jurisdiction. For example, Arkansas would
terminate financial assistance to any mother who was engaging in a “non-stable, non-legal
union” while Michigan would not permit any “male boarders” in the house of the recipient.34
These states argued that both of these practices would make the home unsuitable for children.
Caseworkers would use intrusive tactics such as questioning neighbors and “midnight raids” to
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discover if recipients were violating the rules and would often rescind assistance without
concrete evidence. After almost decade this maltreatment of ADC participants by localities and
states, HEW declared unlawful for the state to declare a home “unsuitable” for children to
receive welfare assistance yet suitable enough for them to live there.35 While this was an
important triumph for the rights of welfare recipients, it started to show the conflict that existed
between politicians in Washington and regional governments.
The Great Society (1960s-1970s)
War on Poverty
The momentum created by President Eisenhower to improve the nation’s welfare system
was revitalized with the election of John F. Kennedy and transferred to Lyndon B. Johnson when
Kennedy was assassinated. During Johnson’s State of the Union Address in 1964, he urged his
colleagues to “let this session of Congress be known…as the session that declared an all-out war
on human poverty and unemployment.”36 This speech would start a legislative revolution for
American society as it fought an “unconditional war on poverty.”37 The Johnson administration
argued that “very often the lack of job and money was not the cause of poverty but its symptom”
and that it was possible to eliminate such necessity through a comprehensive system of
government programs that would allow people a “fair chance to develop their own capacities.”38
President Johnson’s vision to “build the Great Society…where no child will go unfed, and no
youngster will go unschooled…[and] where no man who wants work will fail to find it” was

35
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largely influenced by FDR’s policies.39 As a Democrat from Texas, Johnson was elected to serve
in the House of Representative from 1937-1949 with a New Deal platform and its essence can be
seen in the Johnson plans. If the New Deal had being successful in ending the misery caused by
the Great Depression similar policies could surely have positive effects during prosperous times.
The rhetoric used during his State of Union quickly materialized into what a conservative
author called a “legislative blitzkrieg.”40 A year after of taking office, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was passed and was followed a year later by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, both of which
were quintessential towards enforcing equality under the law for minorities, but faced heavy
opposition from Republicans and conservative Democrats (many of whom would secede the
Democratic Party and become Dixiecrats). While the Civil Rights movement created strong
domestic pressure for these policies to be accepted, the United States also faced international
embarrassment due to Cold War politics. The United States seemed hypocritical when promoting
freedom (and anti-communism) abroad but pictures and videos circulated the globe of Civil
Rights activists being repressed by local police and the National Guard.
Programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps also had their origin in this
administration. There was also an emphasis on improving the implementation of older initiatives
through legislation such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which prevented discrimination in the
sale and rental of housing based on race, gender, or religion. This was done after previous
attempts had failed to guarantee such equality. At the same time, the creation of the Office of
Economic Opportunity—whose slogan was “a hand up, not a hand out”— allowed for the
coordination of job training programs to give people the skills needed to find a job. It was the
39
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combination of strong government support for the needy and a growing economy that was able
to dramatically decrease the level of poverty in the United States. The revival of the New Deal
spirit as well as the pressure from domestic and international sources allowed this legislative
agenda to move forward.
Culture of Poverty
As Congress passed legislation guaranteeing all citizens equal treatment under the law,
the number of ADC recipients began to swell. Individuals who had previously been unjustly
excluded from receiving benefits due to government regulations or personal misinformation
joined the system. ADC’s caseload increased from 3.1 million in 1961 to 10.8 million in 1974 as
new legislation came into effect.41 Critics of welfare saw its growth as a sign of moral decay and
unwillingness of the poor to work for a living. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia conducted
a study of Washington DC’s welfare system and claimed that two-thirds of welfare recipients
were cheating the system.42 Although the results received much media attention, it was plagued
by unscientific procedures and methodological flaws.43 In reality, welfare fraud was between 1-3
percent, a relatively low rate when compared to other programs such as Social Security and
disability insurance at the time.44
Following the attempt of Senator Robert Byrd to scientifically delegitimize welfare
recipients, anthropologist Oscar Lewis claimed the permanency of poverty could be attributed to
familial and cultural characteristics of specific communities. Lewis’ investigation of the poor in
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Mexico and Puerto Rico suggested that there was a “culture of poverty” composed of “lack of
work ethic, resignation, dependence, lack of impulse control, and the inability to delay
gratification among others.”45 He concluded that as long as individuals dwelled in that culture,
welfare would be inadequate and potentially harmful.
Johnson’s Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Moynihan further sorted and developed
Lewis’ ideas in a report to the president where he claimed that decades of slavery and
segregation had left the black community with a weak family structure and an inability to
support themselves.46 Moynihan’s report stirred controversy as its condemnation of femaleheaded households was positively cited by Civil Right activists such as Bayard Rustin, Martin
Luther King Jr. and Whitney Young, but also criticized by other activists such as the NAACP for
“blaming the victims” for their situation.47 While there was a plurality of causes for poverty
among African Americans, it was a fact that they were only eleven percent of the general
population but composed over 45 percent of AFDC cases.48 These academic reports served to
bolster the argument of welfare opponents by turning ideology into scientific fact.
Welfare Rights Movement
The Welfare Rights Movement had a grassroots strategy that attempted to counter the
culture of poverty argument. The movement was spearheaded by the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO) and supported by smaller local groups as well as other national

45

Nadasen et al, 44.
Daniel Moynihan, “The Negro Family: A Case for National Action,” United States Department of Labor.
March 1965. http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm
47
Nadasen et al, 49.
48
Lucy A. Williams, “Decades of Distortion: The Right’s 30-Year Assault on Welfare,” Political Research
Associates. December 1997. http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/12/Decades-ofDistortion.pdf
46

20
organizations such as the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee led by Cesar Chavez.49 In
particular, the NWRO had strong backing from female African Americans and worked with
community legal-aid offices to achieve its goals (More to be discussed in the next section).50
While the Civil Rights Movement served as a valuable ally in the beginning of the Welfare
Rights Movement, the relationship quickly deteriorated as Civil Rights leaders began denouncing
the welfare system as a “total pattern of economic exploitation” that “contributed to the
breakdown of family life.”5152 On the other hand, some libertarian economists like Milton
Friedman were willing to support financial assistance from the government if it came as a
guaranteed income claim that gave individuals the ability to purchase what they wish in the free
market.53 54The new system that Friedman called for would allow government to reduce its
influence on people’s life decisions as well as decrease the overhead spending necessary to run
complex programs such as the Job Corp. However, such proposals ran counter to the
rehabilitation mentality of the time.
Welfare advocates found a partial partner among feminists due to their commitment to
women’s economic liberation. Johnnie Tillmon, one of the nation’s most prominent feminist
leaders, stated the following about the restrictive nature of family welfare programs:
“Welfare is like a super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for the man. But you
can’t divorce him if he treats you bad. He can divorce you, of course, cut you off at
any time he wants. But in that case, he keeps the kids, not you…In an ordinary
marriage the sex is supposed to be for your husband. On AFDC [Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (footnote: change in ADC’s name is explained in the
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“Federal Response” section)], you’re not supposed to have any sex at all. Welfare
controls your money. He tells you what to buy, what not to buy, where to buy it,
and how much things cost.”55
However, it was quickly revealed that the agenda of the feminist movement varied by social
class. For example, middle-class feminists were supportive of having strict child support laws in
order to maintain their standard of living after divorce, but poorer feminists disagree since often
their husbands were abusive and would not have the money to pay child support anyway.56
Nevertheless, as single-mother households increased from 36 to 56 percent of all poor
households between the 1970s and 1980s, the feminist and welfare movements became a natural
match.57
The Courts
Much like the Civil Rights movement, the Welfare Rights movement used the courts to
improve the situation of citizens and make progress towards their goals. In particular, three
Supreme Court rulings determined that AFDC benefits were not charity but legally entitled
benefits. The poor no longer had to trade their civil rights for a welfare check. In King v. Smith
(1968) the United States Supreme Court unanimously decided that the “man-in-the-house” rules
violated the Social Security Act since they defined “parent” in a way that was inconsistent with
the Act.58 This decision granted AFDC recipients a certain level of personal and sexual privacy.
It also reasserted Congress’s legislative decision that “immorality and illegitimacy should be
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dealt with through rehabilitative measures, rather than measures punishing dependent
children.”59
Similarly, Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) prohibited limiting people’s movement across
states on the basis that they would receive higher welfare benefits in their new residence.60 Such
restriction had been particularly effective in limiting migration of African Americans from
Southern to Northern states. At the turn of the twentieth century 90 percent of African Americans
lived in the South and three-fourths lived in rural areas. However, from 1910 to 1960 the
population of African Americans in Northern states more than tripled and was heavily
concentrated in urban areas.61 The Supreme Court believed that states refusing AFDC benefits to
new residents were in violation of the “fundamental right of interstate movement” as guaranteed
by the Constitution.62
During Goldberg v. Kelley (1970) the Supreme Court decided that a “fair hearing”
needed to occur if welfare benefits were going to be rescinded from an individual or family.63
This decision took as a premise that AFDC benefits were “not mere charity, but means to
‘promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.’”64 The court conceded that certain public programs could end administratively
without a hearing but withdrawal of AFDC benefits would “condemn [the recipient] to suffer
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grievous loss” therefore the benefit must be protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.65
These three court cases were instrumental in transforming nineteenth century charity into
twentieth century social safety nets. They strengthened the societal duties between citizens and
prevented the poor from being at the mercy of the wealthy and fickle minded politicians.
Nevertheless, these three court decision would be severely diluted or overturned with the welfare
reform of 1996.
Federal Response to the Great Society
The ideological clash in the streets, courts and Congress during the 1960s caused welfare
legislation to be updated and amended. During the few years that Kennedy was president, he was
able to pass the Aid for Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (ADC-UP) provision in 1961
and the Public Welfare Amendment in 1962. The former created a jobs program that required
men who did not qualify for unemployment insurance to attend a job training program to receive
their welfare benefits and increase their probabilities of re-entering the labor force. The latter
was an amendment that expanded ADC-UP to include women in its job programs as well as
change the name of ADC to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).66
Academic criticism of welfare such as the one presented by Byrd and Lewis had some of
the most influential effects in constricting access to government assistance towards the end of the
Johnson administration. In 1967, Congress passed an amendment to the Social Security Act to
establish a “health and decency” standard as well as a maternal work requirement. This change
created the Work Incentives Program (WIN) as a way to enforce the work requirement on
65
66

Ibid.
Nadasen et al, 35.

24
mothers receiving AFDC assistance67. The amendment also created a “freeze” on benefits for
children born to unwed mothers or deserting fathers. However, this initiative provoked an
outrage among constituents (led by welfare and religious organizations) and it was repealed
within two years of its passing.68
The criticism of the United States welfare system continued through the Nixon
administration. When President Richard Nixon came into office in 1969, he proposed a new
welfare system to Congress called the Family Assistance Plan. It would serve as a plan to
guarantee income for recipients but would be limited to two-parent families, therefore excluding
the majority of AFDC beneficiaries at the time who were predominately single mothers (many of
which were African American).69 However, the plan never came to fruition due to the strong
opposition from grassroots movements. In 1971, the Talmadge Amendment was passed to
toughen the AFDC work requirements for recipients who had school aged children.70 Although it
was not as restrictive as many AFDC critics wanted, it was step in this direction. During his
term, President Jimmy Carter also presented a plan to change the name of AFDC to Program for
Better Jobs and Income. Unlike Nixon, Carter was willing to provide government assistance to
single-mothers, but they would be considered part of a “second tier” that would receive only
some of the benefits of a two-parent family. The Program for Better Jobs and Income failed to
receive approval from the electorate or Congress was also never implemented.

67

Ibid 43.
Ibid.
69
Ibid 54.
70
Ibid 56.
68

25
The New Economy
The economic changes during the 1970s built the foundation which would “end welfare
as we have come know it.”71 The decade was plagued by the Oil Crises of 1973 and 1979 as the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed the United States. This
caused a shortage of gasoline as well as high levels of inflation since the increase in the price of
fuel used during the production of goods and services was being transferred to consumers. An
economic recession quickly followed both crises and unemployment reached its highest point
since the Great Depression.72 Although legislators did created nominal increases to the value of
AFDC benefits, they were not enough to prevent inflationary erosion. By the mid-1980s, the
value of AFDC benefits decreased by 40 percent and the combination of AFDC and food stamps
no longer lifted people out of poverty in any state.73 The nominal increase in AFDC assistance
concealed the real financial decline, especially in front of critics.74
{FIGURE I: AFDC MONTHLY BENEFITS PER FAMILY}
The 1970s also saw a shift in the United States’ economy from a manufacturing-base to a
service-base. Many of the manufacturing positions that gave individuals with basic education the
opportunity to have a family-sustaining salary began to go abroad as companies pursued lower
costs of production.75 At the same time, factories that remained in the country turned to
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automatic production as another way to reduce costs.76 This period of deindustrialization was
exasperated by the Oil Crises that raised expenditure on many firms within the country and
incentivize companies to reduce cost elsewhere.77 American cities were particularly devastated
by this economic phenomenon. Low-income urban residents became unemployed as factories
left cities and did not have the resources to relocate where employment was higher or invest on
their human capital. Recipients found it difficult to comply with the work requirement
established by new welfare legislation due to the structural unemployment inherent in the
economy: There were too many people seeking too few jobs (Chapter 2 will elaborate on the
labor market shift).
Reaganomics (1980s-1990s)
The Circumstances
The plans to construct a Great Society began losing support as the 1970s came to a close
with a troubled economy. Citizens questioned whether the government’s investment on the War
on Poverty was going to end in a victory. Although AFDC rolls had remained stable at around 10
million recipients (approximately 4 percent of the population) throughout the 1970s and 1980s,
conservatives wondered why the numbers were not decreasing.78 Pundits posited that recipients
were complacent (due to the culture of poverty) and were not willing to improve their situation.
However, studies showed that daughters of AFDC recipients were not more likely to be part of
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the program than those who came from non-AFDC families.7980 Welfare was also blame for
discouraging work and thereby harming the economy
Critics were also quick to judge the supposed sexual deviance that stereotyped AFDC
recipients. Moral decay was worrisome since the divorce rate had tripled from 1960 to 1980.81
By 1990, 30% of all children were born to unmarried mothers. However, the increase of this
percentage was due to the lowering in the fertility rate of married mothers rather than an increase
of wedlock babies. Welfare opponents groundlessly attacked young women for their supposed
sexual promiscuity even though teenage pregnancy had greatly decreased since peaking in the
1950s and 1960s.82
{FIGURE II: BIRTH RATES FOR WOMEN AGES 15-19 FROM 1940-2010}
Similarly, AFDC also saw its recipients’ average family size shrink in accordance with the
national trend.83 While one claim was that AFDC mothers were having more children to swindle
the government, such claims do not match the data of the time. Nevertheless, this did not stop
attacks on the welfare system from politicians and conservative pundits.
One of the most damning accusations towards welfare was that it discouraged work
among the poor and thereby harmed the economy. After all, critics claimed, who would search
for a job if they can be paid without working? However, international research done of twenty
OECD member countries found no evidence to conclude that welfare benefits obstruct economic
79

Ibid.
The study looks into AFDC’s effect on daughters rather than sons because most recipients were single mothers,
therefore the question rises whether the parent will serve as a gender role model for their child
81
Nadasen et al, 73.
82
Brady E. Hamilton and Stephanie J. Venture. “Birth Rates for U.S. Teenagers Reach Historic Lows for All
Ages and Ethnic Groups,” Center for Disease Control. April 2012. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/
db89.pdf
83
“2008 Indicator of Welfare Dependence.”

80

28
growth.84 The National Institute of Health (NIH) has conducted similar research and concluded
that unsupportive welfare programs can lead to substantially lower income levels among former
recipients.85 Higher incomes for individuals that exited the program are desired so they can be
active consumers in their local markets and stimulate the economy in their vicinity.
“America’s Right Turn”
Ronald Reagan would set the tone for his presidency and the 1980s during his 1981
inauguration speech: “government is not the solution; government is the problem.” Although
government spending increased every fiscal year of the Reagan administration, Republican
politicians insisted that government was a shrinking entity.86 Neither Republicans nor Democrats
were willing to show much support for AFDC or welfare programs in general as political
conservatism took hold of the national stage. The Democratic Party which had created and
developed welfare in the United States, began to retreat from its historical position. As racial
discrimination for access to AFDC began to decrease in the late 1960s, many critics believed that
African Americans were taking advantage of the system due to their overrepresentation within its
roll. (The graph below shows that Blacks have almost as many AFDC cases as Whites although
they make up a smaller part of the population). Democrats feared losing white voters by
supporting a stigmatized program and began to disassociate from it. This resulted in many
Democrats sponsoring or voting for legislation to limit AFDC.87
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{FIGURE III: NUMBER OF AFDC/TANF FAMILIES BY RACE}
One of Reagan’s most powerful attacks against AFDC came from his construction of the
“Welfare Queen.” While on the campaign trail in 1976, Reagan was often caught telling a story
of “a woman in Chicago” that has “80 names, 30 addresses, 12 social security cards and is
collecting veteran benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands.”88 He continued by saying
that aside from “collecting Social Security on her card. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps,
and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over
$150,000.”89 At other times, Reagan would tell his crowd about Taino Towers, a subsidized
housing project in New York City, where people could rent “an apartment with an 11-foot
ceiling, with a 20-foot balcony, a swimming pool and gymnasium, laundry room and play room”
for $113.40.90 These stories resonated with his audience and supported the stereotypes
surrounding welfare recipients since the program’s inception. Many listeners were enraged at the
luxurious life of Welfare Queens and at how easy it was to swindle the government. Further
accusations were made by the media such as Reader’s Digest which in 1980 reported that “a
significant proportion of tax funds spent on welfare is consumed by fraud, waste, and abuse” but
cited no empirical evidence to support this.91
Later investigations by journalists and welfare authorities in Illinois discovered that
Reagan’s description of “a woman in Chicago” was of Linda Taylor, but the then-presidential
candidate had largely exaggerated the story. The New York Times reported that she had used two
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aliases to collect $8,000 of welfare benefits (rather than 80 aliases for $150,000).92 Similarly,
Taino Towers was a much humbler housing project than Reagan described. Only 92 of the 656
apartments had an 11-foot ceiling (only over the kitchen and living room) and were reserved for
larger families.9394 In addition, rent was $415 and all amenities had to be shared with 200,000
individuals in the community.95
Literature from Critics
In 1984, conservative author Charles Murray published Losing Ground as a proposal to
eliminate welfare assistance. Afterwards, one of his colleagues, Lawrence Mead, responded with
Beyond Entitlement, a book where he called for a significant reform of the welfare system rather
than its dissolution. Murray’s criticism of the system stemmed from the belief that policies had
made it “profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in ways that were destructive in the
long term” where the government “tried to remove the barriers to escape poverty, and
inadvertently built a trap.”96 On the other hand, Mead argued that welfare should be used as an
incentive to make the poor work since “employment must become a duty, enforced by public
authority.”97 The writings of both of these authors represent the theoretical framework on which
the welfare reform of 1996 would be based.
However, many of the central conclusions by both authors are improperly drawn.
Murray’s deductions extend from a hypothetical where the biological parents of a child decide
whether they want get married and/or find a job based on the incentives given by AFDC and
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other welfare programs. Critics have pointed out that the calculations are based on exaggerated
welfare benefits that do not match their true value.98 At the same time, Murray claimed that the
increase in value of AFDC assistance was the culprit for the increase in wedlock births during
the 1970s, but noted earlier, welfare benefits decreased in real value due to inflation in that
decade and could not have served as a motivator for out-of-wedlock births. Murray also argued
that ADC strayed from its original purpose of assisting widows to care for their children, but as
seen in the original text of the Social Security Act of 1935, the program was created to assist
many categories of dependent children.99
Mead followed a similar set of unwarranted assumptions to conclude that welfare benefits
should be used as a tool to reform the poor morally. He argued that AFDC could serve as an
incentive to prevent the rate of separation and divorce among the poor as well as instill in them a
strong work ethic. However, a report from Reagan’s General Accounting Office in 1987 clearly
concluded that “research does not support the view that welfare encourages two-parent family
break up.”100 A report by the Department of Health and Human Services established that
approximately three in every four AFDC recipients were in the system for less than five years,
and almost 20% were there less six months, thus decoupling the idea that welfare payments
automatically create dependency and a disincentive to work.101 Nevertheless, Murray’s and
Mead’s ideas had further eroded people’s confidence on the welfare system and evoked a strong
reaction from the government.
{FIGURE IV: TOTAL TIME IN AFDC 1979-1994}
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Federal Response to Reaganomics
President Reagan’s first provision to weaken the welfare system was the signing of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, as passed by a Democratic Congress. The Act
reduced aid to low-income Americans from 14 percent of federal spending in 1978 to under 12
percent by 1988.102 This nominal decrease further exacerbates the lost in value of AFDC benefits
during the 1970s. Reagan made a more direct impact on the system through the Family Support
Act of 1988. The three main pillars of the Act were the requirement for all recipients with
children over the age of three to enter the labor force, the replacement of the Work Incentives
Program (WIN) with Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program, and the increase in
state discretion.103
The JOBS initiative along with other educational programs was poorly funded by
Congress and produced humble results when it came to job placement. On the other hand, many
states started creating new ways to restrict and reduce the benefits of AFDC recipients. For
example, provisions such as “Learnfare” reduced a family’s AFDC grant if a child missed a
certain number of school days while “Family Cap” reduced the grant if a woman bore a child
when receiving government assistance.104 The Family Support Act of 1988 and the state
legislature that followed continued to treat AFDC recipients as guilty of immoral behavior that
had placed them in their current position. This legislation was founded on the belief that
harshness is needed to create moral rectitude.
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Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed some of the essential influences and turning points of welfare
policy in the United States. Since its inception with the Social Security Act of 1935, AFDC has
attempted to include single mothers as part of the “worthy poor.” However, its recipients have
always been stereotyped as swindlers and morally corrupt individuals, characteristics that
Reagan eventually consolidated in the “Welfare Queen.” Although many gains were made
during the Johnson’s War on Poverty, they were contingent on economic prosperity. With the
financial instability of the 1970s, AFDC became a superfluous program assisting “unworthy”
citizens. Strong claims were made against the program by conservative opponents, but few (if
any) accurately described its complex nature. Nevertheless, these fallacious claims had the most
impact in amending welfare.
Almost 400 years after the passing of Elizabethan Poor Laws, policymakers, think tanks
and academics in the United States attempt to keep the supposed unworthy poor from draining
the government’s coffers. Efforts by policymakers to prevent fraudulent welfare claims
significantly intensified after the Johnson Administration, and took priority over creating
constructive programs for its recipients. Policymakers became gatekeepers of tax funds rather
than architects of social reform. By 1996, there were not enough citizens, state legislators, or
federal politicians defending welfare to prevent a complete overhaul of the welfare system.
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Chapter 2: Welfare Reform
Introduction
{FIGURE V: DECLINE IN AFDC/TANF CASELOAD EVEN WHEN POVERTY
INCREASES}
The chart above conveys the impact of one of the most significant welfare reforms in the
history of United States and how it changed the relationship of federal and state governments
with its poorest citizens. While data from before 1996 shows that AFDC assistance was directly
correlated with the number of families in poverty, a decoupling occurred after the welfare reform
was approved on that year. In particular, from 1996 to 2012 the caseload for AFDC/TANF
decreased by 60 percent even though poverty and deep poverty105 increased: government was
restricting assistance regardless of who needed it.106 With the 1996 welfare reform, Democrats
and Republicans were expecting that less generous benefits would push AFDC recipients into
jobs and out of poverty, but that was not the case. Economic changes such as the restructuring of
the labor market and the widening of income inequality are in part responsible for exasperating
the situation of low-income communities. But it was ultimately the welfare reform that prevented
government from responding adequately to structural changes.
This chapter will argue that AFDC/TANF become ineffective in assisting families in
poverty due to its reform through the Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and reauthorization through the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005. AFDC after the reform was not meant to “provide for the general welfare” but rather to
prevent dependency among its recipients. The change in the purpose of welfare, the introduction
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of job requirements and the establishment of lifetime limits were among the most radical changes
of the reform. It is also important to note that the deterioration of the United States’ social safety
nets and situation of those living in poverty could not have been possible without broad public
support. Individuals in the United States have held an animosity towards welfare since its
beginning but a climax was reached in 1996 after almost a decade of badgering by conservative
pundits and the Reagan administration.
Circumstances
Economic Inequality
The last decade of the century started with an economic recession from July 1990 to
March 1991.107 The recession was relatively short and mild: GDP growth was -3.5% in the
Fourth Quarter of 1990 and -1.9% in the First Quarter of 1991 and unemployment rose to
7.8%.108109 Nevertheless, this was the first slowdown that occurred after almost a decade of
bonanza. While the United States’ unprecedented period of post-war prosperity continued until
the late 2000s, the economic truism that “a rising tide lifts all boats” became more easily
refutable from the 1990s forward. The Federal Reserve of St. Louis has highlighted the
disconnect between corporate and employee success: corporate profits have reached all-time
highs while wages continue the free fall that began in the 1970s.110 Moreover, top wage earners
have reaped the largest portion of the economic benefits since 1973 but the earnings of those at
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the bottom of the scale have stagnated.111 Therefore, even the poor who succeed in finding a job
struggle to improve their economic situation.
{FIGURE VI: CORPORATE PROFIT/GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT}
{FIGURE VII: WAGES & SALARY ACCRUALS/GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT}
{FIGURE VIII: CHANGE IN WAGES OVER TIME}
The Census Bureau indicates that from 1967 to 2010 income inequality increased by 18
percent, and nearly half occurred during the 1980s.112 This national average conceals the more
staggering inequality growth occurring at the county level. A similar study by Piketty and Saez
(2007) discovered that the income segment controlled by the top ten percent of taxpayers
increased from 31.7 in 1960 to 44.3 percent in 2005, while the segment controlled by the top one
percent increased from 8.4 percent in 1960 to 17.4 percent in 2005.113 The Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), an economic organization composed of the
wealthiest countries in the world, has reported similar findings for the United States. The Gini
Coefficient, used to measure income inequality, showed that from the mid-1970s to the mid2000s the difference between the bottom and top income quintiles in the United States increased
by 20 percent even after taxes and transfer payments.114 The Federal Reserve of Boston
explained that the “increasing disparity [of income] was a significant reversal of the U.S.
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experience between 1950 and 1970, when rapid economic growth occurred along with a decrease
in the difference between the incomes of the rich and poor.”115
Public opinion polls show that Americans are willing to tolerate higher levels of income
inequality as long as social mobility is a feasible option, especially when compared to their
European and Japanese counterparts. However, research and data has shown that while social
mobility increased from the 1950s to 1980s, it has drastically declined since that time.116 A study
conducted by the economists Katherine Braudy and Jane Katz demonstrated that 53 percent of
families that began 1988 in the poorest quintile were still there ten years later.117 Furthermore,
only 33 percent of all families were able to move up one quintile.118 Based on this data one can
assume that social mobility, the foundation of the American Dream, has been eroding for many
families.
Labor Market
The American Dream is dependent on education and hard work but the opportunity to do
either has disappeared. Critics of the welfare programs often state that recipients should focus on
these two areas to succeed economically rather than receiving handouts from the government.
However, studies such as that by Andrew Delbanco convey the decline of accessibility to quality
higher education. His research demonstrates that between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, in a
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sample of eleven prestigious colleges, the percentage of students in the bottom quartile of
national family income remained at approximately 10 percent. At the same time, the percentage
of students from the top quartile increased sharply from one third to one half. If the sample is
broadened to include the top 150 colleges, the percentage of students from the bottom quartile
drops to 3 percent.119 This means that a decrease in welfare benefits has been accompanied by a
decrease in the number of low income individuals attending prestigious institutions of higher
education. Rather than pushing recipients to success, lower benefits seem to have had a negative
effect on education for the poor (Footnote: there has also been an increase of college prices).
Moreover, entering the labor force with limited education has become riskier and less
beneficial. During the early and middle part of the twentieth century, low income individuals
used blue collar jobs to improve their social position, but now those jobs are scarce. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States went through a period of deindustrialization
and hollowing out of urban centers starting in the mid-1970s. A report by the Federal Reserve of
Chicago shows that 28.4 percent of nonfarm workers were employed in manufacturing in 1960
in comparison to 16.2 percent in 1990 and 9.1 percent in 2009.120 Overall, the productivity of the
manufacturing sector has grown by approximately 2.9% in the past 60 years allowing 184
workers to produce in 2009 what took 1000 workers in 1950.121 While increased productivity is
beneficial for the economy, policymakers must not ignore the dislocated workers that become
collateral damage of progress. For example, after the 2000-2001 recession, data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics shows that the employment-to-population ratio plummeted from its highest
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historical level of 65 percent to a low of 62 percent.122 This decrease translates to about three
million people becoming unemployed. It is important to note that the ratio never returned to its
1990s level and fell significantly during the Great Recession of 2007.123
{FIGURE IX: EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO}
The changes in the labor market, the disparity in higher education and income inequality as well
as the lack of financial support from the government has created an environment that stifles
poverty reduction, social mobility and economic development.
State of Welfare
While the image of welfare recipients in the 1990s was predominately that of Reagan’s
Welfare Queens whose numbers were constantly expanding and were ready to burden the
government through their poor work ethic, data characterized them differently. Up to the welfare
reform of 1996, the percentage of AFDC beneficiaries out of the United States population
remained approximately the same as it had been for the past four decades ago (~4.5 percent).124
The stability of welfare rolls is impressive considering the rate at which the low-income
community was losing jobs. According to the Census, in 1993 the United States had 36 million
mothers between the ages of 15 to 44, 3.8 million received AFDC payments to assist in the
parenting of 9.7 million children.125126 Similar to the way newspapers tried to debunk Reagan’s
Welfare Queen stories during the 1980, Census data objectively rectifies the exaggerations that
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recipients were sex-driven, immoral female teenagers who purposefully gave birth to several
children so that they could live on government benefits. The figures show that AFDC mothers
were on average only three years younger than non-AFDC mothers when they had their first
child. Similarly, AFDC mothers had on average 2.6 children in comparison to the 2.1 children
had by their counterparts.127 Furthemore, there was no significant difference between the
numbers of children born to black or white AFDC mothers. Mothers receiving this type of
government aid were also 10% more likely to have never been married than the general
population.128 While the stereotypes have a grain of truth, they mainly distort information about
the age, fertility rate, and marital status of beneficiaries.
At the same time, the struggle faced by welfare recipients was often ignored during the
welfare debates of the 1990s. Nearly three-quarters of mothers on AFDC lived in families
supporting an average of 2.7 children with monthly incomes of less than $1,000. Because of the
shortcoming of the financial support four in five AFDC mothers lived below the poverty line.129
Similarly, the Census reports that in 1993, one in seven AFDC mothers were enrolled in school
with an average age of 28 and supporting 2.1 children. Since only 11 percent of these students
were teenagers, the information suggests that most were finishing their education while raising a
family “under severe economic conditions.”130
Political Attitude
The tone for welfare reform during the 1990s was set by Democratic President Bill
Clinton during his 1992 campaign when he promised to “end welfare as we have come know
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it.”131 Clinton’s plan was to make welfare “a second chance, not a way of life,” echoing the
argument against AFDC dependency that became popular during the Reagan administration.132
The President’s priority during his first two years in office was to create a universal healthcare
system and by the time his welfare proposal was considered in 1994, Republicans had won the
majority in Congress and had an agenda of their own.
Republicans in the 104th Congress, trying to mimic FDR’s New Deal, made a “Contract
with America” that was signed 367 congressional candidates.133 Eleven working groups were
created by the Republicans who were already Members of the House of Representatives. They
eventually drafted ten bills that made up the Contract and were supposed to be passed in the first
90 days of Congress. One of those bills was the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA) that brought
an end to AFDC. The PRA as stated in the Contract was intended to:
“Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor
mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, cut
spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision with
work requirements to promote individual responsibility.”134
While the condition stated for welfare recipients were harsh, the rhetoric of elected
officials who won in the 1992 and 1994 elections was worse. Representative Newt Gingrich (RGA), who in 1994 became the first Republican House Speaker in six decades, recommended that
children who were deprived of financial assistance due to the reform should be placed in
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orphanages where they could be raised under close government supervision.135 Similarly, Florida
Representative John Mica compared providing TANF benefits to feeding alligators, a practice
which Mica explained his state rejected since “unnatural feeding and care creates
dependency.”136 President Clinton had vetoed two earlier versions of the then-called Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, but with an election months away where welfare
reform would be a key issue, he decided to approve the third version. While Democrats were
able to amend a few of the most radical changes, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act would still be the most significant change to the United States
welfare system.
Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
Legislative Findings and Purpose
The findings and purpose of the PRWORA set the parameters through which the Act
would function. Its foundation made it clear that the focus of the Act was not to address poverty
but to prevent dependency. The final version of PRWORA had as a general purpose to give
greater flexibility to the states in managing programs that:
1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2) end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage; 3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-ofwedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing
and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and 4) encourage the
formation and maintenance of two-parent families.137
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The purpose of the Act was considerably different from that stated for AFDC in the Social
Security Act. It was not meant to “provide for the general welfare” as its predecessor had, but
rather to impose a strong set of norms that, if followed, could grant an individual a certain level
of financial aid. It systematically ignored changes in the labor market as well as cultural shifts
that were not necessarily erroneous (e.g. less people were getting married in the general
population) in order to impose moral reform. PRWORA also clearly stated that individual or
family assistance was not an entitlement for its recipients. This statement overrode the judicial
victories that had transformed AFDC from societal charity to a governmental responsibility,
thereby leaving recipients vulnerable to the political ebbs and flows.
Moreover, many of the fundamental facts of the Act were, to a certain extent,
disingenuous. For example, the PRWORA found that “while the number of children receiving
AFDC benefits increased nearly threefold between 1965 and 1992, the total number of children
in the United States aged 0 to 18 has declined by 5.5 percent.”138 However, conservative
lawmakers failed to mentioned that during the study’s base year of 1965, states were slowly
beginning to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prevented the government from
withholding social services based on “race, color, religion, or native origin.”139 The Republicans
of the 104th Congress also made their cultural conservatism present by stating in the bill that
“marriage is the foundation of a successful society.”140 This was an indirect attack to AFDC’s
largest group of beneficiaries, unmarried mothers, for causing society’s failure. Many supporters
of the bill had low expectations for female-led, low-income households, as evidenced by Speaker
Gingrich’s proposal to use orphanages raise children on AFDC.
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New Requirements
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act reconfigured the
relationship between the federal government, the states, and low-income families as well as
changed the name of the program from AFDC to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF). The three main changes to the program came in the form of its financing, the creation
of particular requirements to receive benefits, and limiting such benefits to five year per lifetime.
As seen previously, these alterations mainly followed ideological belief rather than research.
– Financial Structure:
TANF was to be financed by a Congressional appropriation of $16.5 billion (only 1
percent of the 1996 federal budget) per year distributed among all 50 states in the form of a block
grant.141 This amount was not be adjusted for inflation in the following years and would stay the
same regardless of the changes in the amount of welfare recipient or the benefits that the state
offered, creating a mechanism by which benefits would be continuously reduced.142 Although the
appropriation would be a small decline from the amount spent by the federal government in
1995, it was 25% less than what the government used to provide in the 1970s (adjusted for
inflation).143 The requirement for TANF to be reauthorized after a certain number of years also
left it exposed to constant changes in rules and finances, as it will be seen later in this paper with
the 2005 reauthorization.
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PRWORA also required states to contribute 80% of their “qualified State expenditure”
for social services listed in the bill and use 1995 as a base year.144145 This would become a
Maintenance-of-Effort (MOE) requirement for states. While it saddled states with a rigid line of
expenditure, it also allowed TANF beneficiaries to be excluded from some federal requirements
(i.e. the work requirement, lifetime limits, and participation rate calculation that would be
discussed later in the paper).
Congress also created a contingency fund of $2 billion to support an increase in benefit
claims during an economic downturn over a period of five years.146 However, lawmakers should
have realized that the fund would be insufficient since during the relatively mild recession of
1991-1992, AFDC claims had increased by $6 billion over three years.147 This poorly prepared
emergency plan would prove to be too fragile during the 2008 financial crisis.
– Work Requirement
Republican proponents of welfare reform also required individuals to participate in at
least one of twelve categories of work as well as meet several other requirements to be eligible
for TANF.148 Such eligibility requirements are meant to separate the worthy from the unworthy
poor but policymakers unreasonably assume that effort alone will make the prerequisites
achievable. For example, single-parent homes with children under 6 years of age were required
to fulfill 20 hours of work per week while two-parent homes were require to have 35 hour of
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work per week.149 Similarly, a family receiving federally funded childcare has to participate in
55 hours of work a week.150 However, these requirements ignore the possibility that harsh
economic times limit the availability of work and other professional opportunities. Overall, the
Urban Institute has found approximately 24 practices used by states under PRWORA to make
individuals ineligible for TANF or have their benefits harshly decreased (more will be discussed
in the subsection called Long-Term Effects).
– Lifetime Limit
The creation of a 60 month lifetime limit for welfare recipients was meant to prevent
citizens from becoming dependent on the program and incentivize them to find work quickly.
While this is almost twice as long as the Contract with America suggested, no rationale was
provided for this length of time. Furthermore, 60 months is only a federally mandated maximum,
but states can further limit the amount of time someone can be a recipient. For example, in 2011,
in midst of one of the worst economic downturns in modern history, Arizona decided to shorten
its lifetime limit to 24 months. This new policy caused approximately 3,500 low-income families
to lose vital governmental support.151 The shortening of time limits is not unique to conservative
states. Also in 2011, California shortened the time limit for adults receiving TANF from 60 to 48
months. A household of three with one parent would see its benefits decrease by $122 per
months once the parent reached the 48th month.152 As it can be seen from these figure, many
people leaving TANF are not doing so because they have improved their economic situation but
because the government has restructure the rules by which it is willing to help.
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Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
Focusing the Rules
Congressmen voted on the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) along party lines, with
only five Democrats supporting it through the process.153 It placed greater budgetary constraints
on TANF and showed that state flexibility will only be recognized if it supports the conservative
ideology of more restricted government benefits. TANF was significantly affected by the
decision of a Republican controlled Congress to keep its appropriation at $16.5 billion because
inflation had eroded 20% of its real value since 1996.154 Similarly, the DRA incentivized states
to decrease their caseloads, taking recipients off of welfare regardless of whether they had
improved their economic situation. The 1996 law had established that 1995 would be a base year
by which any measure would be compared. A decrease in the number of recipients or wedlock
newborns could provide individual states with extra funds as well as prevent them from being
penalized.155 DRA adjusted the base year for TANF comparisons to 2005, thereby encouraging
states to further decrease a caseload that was at a record low.156
At the same time, the Act instructed the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to define the twelve categories of “work activities” as well as specify uniform methods
for reporting work hours and the type of documentation needed to verify reported work hours
within the next six months.157 The decision by Republicans to have strong federal oversight over
this program was clearly in opposition to states such as California and New York that were being
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relatively generous with their benefits since 1996, but it also contradicted their original goal to
give states greater flexibility with welfare programs. Congress also established through this law a
penalty reducing up to five percent of a state’s block grant if it failed to implement the
procedures and internal controls as mandated by HHS. States that were already receiving limited
funds were forced to divert resources away from public assistance to program administration or
face receiving even less funds.
Participation Rate
PRWORA established that the participation rate would be calculated by dividing the
number of adults participating in work activities for the number of hours specified by the total
number of families receiving assistance each month that include an adult or minor head of
household.158 DRA accepted this formula but now also counts financial assistance funded by
MOE as part of the denominator. This change caused the number of states not meeting at least
one of the participation rates to jump from 6 in 2006 to 32 by 2007.159 Moreover, those 32 states
would have five percent of their adjusted State Family Assistance Grant reduced, plus two
percent for every subsequent year they failed to meet the requirement.160 To further aggravate the
financial situation of the penalized states, each state must expand its funding by the amount it is
being sanctioned for. Any state that fails to do so is subject to an additional penalty of up to 2
percent of its basic TANF grant161. DRA also confirmed that all states needed 50% of all single
parent families and 90% of all two-parent families to have work.162 Failure to do so would
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decrease the state’s block grant by amount of percentage points it was missing to reach the
federal goal.163
Once again, it seems hypocritical that welfare reform advocates argue for giving states
greater flexibility with federal dollars while imposing penalties if those states fail to abide by
federal rules. As a response to the resetting of the base year to 2005 and the counting of MOEfunded programs towards the participation rate, many states employed creative ways to reach the
federally established goals. While DRA declared that a state may not count caseload declines
resulting from new requirements, it “may count the reductions attributable to enforcement
mechanisms or procedural requirements that are used to enforce existing eligibility criteria.”164
Under this circumstances the states faced a dilemma: (1) reduce the number of participants who
could compromise the state’s ability to reach the participation rate in order have more adequate
funding for those who remained; or (2) accept a series of penalties while still accommodating a
large pool of applicants through inadequate benefits. As we will see in the next section, states
aggressively used “enforcement mechanism or procedural requirements” to prevent their funds
from dwindling.165
Effects of Welfare Legislation
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 not only changed the name of one of the most important social
safety nets of the United States but impaired the ability of federal and state governments to
alleviate poverty. As mentioned earlier, the TANF caseload decreased by 60 percent after the
1996 reform even though poverty and deep poverty had increased. In some states like Louisiana,
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Wyoming, Illinois and Georgia, the caseload decline has been as high as 80 percent.166 The
poverty rate did decline during the first four years after the reform, but has increased since 2000
and is currently above its 1996 level. Reports from the Department of Health and Human
Services as well as the Urban Institute argue that the decline during these first few years can be
mainly attributed to a booming economy.167
It is important to note that a decrease in caseloads only means a particular person has
exited the program but is not necessarily equivalent to people finding jobs or having higher
incomes. A large part of the decreased of caseload can be attributed to attrition suffered by the
TANF “take-up” rate, defined as the share of eligible families that enrolled. The take-up has
declined from 77 percent in 1996 to 36 percent in 2007.168 This change indicates that households
that are eligible to receive assistance but are choosing not do so do not know they are qualified,
find it difficult to enroll, or are being otherwise diverted.169 At the same time, state governments
have been forced to use harsh rules to maintain their TANF rolls with those who are most
employable. HHS reports that approximately half of all TANF cases are closed due to
enforcement of an eligibility criterion.170 It is clear that under its current rules, TANF has failed
to stimulate employment among recipients.
{FIGURE X: TAND FAMILIES BY REASON FOR CLOSURE FY 2010}
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Even the cases that are accepted are often underfunded since they cover the child but provide no
assistance for the parent or guardian. The Urban Institute reports that approximately half of all
TANF cases are child-only. One-third of child-only cases occur because the child is living with a
grandparent even though PRWORA had as a goal to keep children in the care of parents and
relatives.171 Child-only cases place the program back to the early 1900s when caretakers were
not counted when calculating government assistance.
Overall, the value of TANF, nominal and real, provides inadequate financial assistance to
needy families. While some value has been eroded away by inflation, a significant part has been
earmarked for other purposes. The inflation-adjusted value of TANF benefits has declined in all
but two states – Mississippi and Wyoming. Nevertheless, the situation in these two states is still
suboptimal.172 For example, 80% of all TANF cases in Wyoming are child-only and do not take
into account the survival of the caretaker. Even when considering the benefits nominally, in
2011, a family of three received $428 per month in the median state in (in 14 states, such a
family received less than $300).173 Furthermore, much of the financial assistance that families
once received has been syphoned to “non-assistance” service such as child care, transportation,
and refundable tax credits. In 1997 only 30 percent of TANF expenditure went to non-assistance
services compared to 70 percent in 2007.174 When aggregating inflation and benefit cuts, cash
assistance have been reduced by approximately 56 percent since 1969.175 While the nonassistance services are helpful to families, they cannot substitute for the needs of a regular
household, such as rent, utilities, food, and clothing.
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Solving the Culture of Poverty
Democrats and Republicans were expecting that the less generous benefits found in
PRWORA would push former AFDC recipients into finding jobs and away from a life of
poverty. However, as {FIGURE 1?} demonstrated, that has not been the case. People are not
accepting government benefits because doing so is better than working, but because they have no
other option. Nonetheless, even under the meager circumstances in which recipients find
themselves, they have been able to find ways out of poverty. HHS reports that the average length
of assistance for a family in TANF in 2006 was 35.4 months.176 Similar to when AFDC was in
place (without time limits), only twelve percent of cases last for four or more years.177 TANF
recipients do not grow dependent of government aid, but seek their own independence as
suggested by data.
Moreover, TANF opponents also hoped that increasing employment among mothers
would make children value education and work preparation, but little evidence supports or
refutes these claims.178 Even the attempt of welfare reform to increase marriage rates has proven
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, cohabitation has increased, but most likely due to mothers’ need for
shared incomes.179 Unfortunately, the closing of the employment gap between single mothers
with a high-school education or less and their childless counterparts in 2000 was followed by a
decline in employment for both groups.180 This suggests that employment strategies that worked
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in the past to employ single mothers will not work now due to fewer jobs available and
competition with more educated and better qualified women.
Closing Remarks
While the PRWORA and DRA have succeeded in decreasing enrollment in
AFDC/TANF, they have failed to translate that decline into a decrease of people in poverty or a
lower unemployment rate among welfare recipients. The economic situation described at the
beginning of this chapter will surely make legislative action to decrease poverty an arduous task,
but one that is worth doing to fulfill the government’s Constitutional duty “to promote the
general welfare.” However, if change is to be brought forward it is important to understand the
opinion of United States citizens. It was the concern of the electorate that the “culture of
poverty” was abusing the welfare system that led to the 104th Congress and the Clinton
administration passing PRWORA. Policymakers were quick to respond to their constituents’
demands regardless of the factual or empirical validity of their beliefs.
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Chapter 3: Public Opinion
Introduction
The two previous chapters have explained how ADC was created in response to the Great
Depression and developed over the next seven decades. In particular, Chapter 3 analyzed the
welfare overhaul that occurred in 1996 and the repercussions it has had since. However, none of
these changes occurred in a vacuum. Alongside politics and the economy, changes in public
opinion, politics have helped drive the direction of the welfare program whether it was through
the New Deal, the Great Society or PRWORA. Hence, public opinion is the subject of this
chapter.
Boston College Professor William Gamson explains that “broad shifts in public
sentiment, and electoral changes and rhythms all have a heavy influence on whether political
consciousness ever gets translated into action.”181 At the same time, it is possible for political
consciousness to affect public sentiments by creating a narrative that the electorate can follow, as
seen in the previous chapters. This phenomenon creates a bilateral relationship where
policymakers and citizens affect each other’s opinions and ideological viewpoints. This chapter
will mainly focus on analyzing how public opinion is essential in determining what “welfare” is
and the effects it has on the policymaking process. It will highlight the paradox between what
people desire for anti-poverty policies and the policies they support. Failure to understand these
ideas will hinder any possibility for welfare reform.
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Welfare as Perceived182
What is Welfare?
Welfare is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “aid in the form of money or
necessities for those in need.”183 However, in the United States “welfare” has a negative
connotation and is used as an epithet for government programs and people. This word is almost
always associated with poor work ethic, immoral behavior, and dependency. For many decades
welfare opponents have been successful in narrowly defining welfare as a burden on society.
Nonetheless, when the essence of welfare programs or recipients are presented to individuals but
are not labeled as welfare, respondents tend to be more sympathetic. This is vital when
measuring public opinion and determining the political will of the electorate: people like the idea
of welfare but not its connotation or the stereotypical person that it has historically served.
Although many Americans believe that the needy must be self-reliant and help
themselves, polls indicate that Americans are more sympathetic to the “poor” than to “people on
welfare” even though both groups greatly overlap. Data from the American National Election
Survey (ANES) has shown that since 1976, respondents feel “warmer” (or more sympathetic)
towards the poor184 than to those who receive welfare.185186 In 1994, when the GOP gained the
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majority in Congress, ANES data showed an obvious decline in positive feelings for welfare
recipients. Overall, public opinion towards those in poverty has remained on average over 20
points above that for welfare. While the latest data from 2008 shows some improvement in the
popularity of welfare recipients, the temperature gap remains (56% versus 74% respectively).
{FIGURE XI: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE
RECIPIENT AND THE POOR}
The ANES data also highlights some important demographic differences when it comes
to the feelings people express towards welfare recipients. The trends suggest that gender187 and
the attainment of a high-school diploma188 play a negligible role in influencing people’s opinion
on the issue on welfare while party identification189 and race190 have a significant effect.
Republicans have on average been seven percentage-points below Democrats in their sympathy
for welfare recipients but in 1994 the gap grew. It is also important to note that the opinion of
Democrats and Republicans has generally changed in the same direction since 1976. However, in
2008, for the first time in three decades, Republicans became less sympathetic towards welfare
recipients while Democrats became more sympathetic. This can probably be attributed to
Republican’s striving for a balance budget as the national debt was brought to the forefront of the
political arena, especially during the presidential campaign that year. For many members of the
Grand Old Party welfare spending was no longer just ineffective, it was burdening the country.
{FIGURE XII: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE
RECIPIENTS BASED ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION}
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Similarly, whites generally have been less sympathetic towards welfare recipients than blacks. In
1976 and 1980 the opinion gap was greater than twenty points. It was not until 1986 that the gap
became closer to the current average. Nevertheless, the difference in opinion between whites and
blacks began widening again in 2008.
{FIGURE XIII: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE
RECIPIENTS BASED ON RACE}
The General Social Survey (GSS), one of the largest sociological surveys in the United
States, reports very similar trends from its respondents. Since 1984 the support for government
spending in programs assisting the poor has been almost three times that of welfare. It also clear
that there is a positive correlation for the support of both types of programs even though
assistance for the poor has always been higher. Data from the GSS also conveys that at any point
since 1978, approximately half of Americans are in favor of some degree of government action
in reducing income inequality.191 At the same time, data from ANES shows that the general
public does not want the government to guaranteed jobs for those who seek them.192 The view of
wanting less inequality and less interference from the government in the labor markets would
lead to policies of direct cash transfers such as AFDC/TANF. Yet, these are programs that
respondents dislike. This cognitive dissonance has plagued welfare programs since the New
Deal. The electorate favors helping the poor but devalues the very government programs that do
so.
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Self-Reflection
It is also important to note that even those with the lowest incomes are particularly
antagonistic towards welfare recipients193. In 1996, 19 percent of this group expressed
disapproval towards welfare beneficiaries in comparison to only five percent towards the poor. In
the less contentious years of 1976 and 2008, the feelings of those in the lowest quintile matched
the overall average for the poor but were ten percentile points below for welfare beneficiaries. At
the same time, as one moves up the income scale there tends to be higher levels of dislike
towards individuals receiving government aid but there is little to no change of feelings towards
the poor. This seems to suggest that while members of the lowest quintile have disconnect
between their animosity for welfare recipients and the poor, they can be relatively more
understanding towards these categories than the upper quintiles.
While ANES and GSS shed some light on the thoughts of low-income communities, they
are not able to provide the public with the actual thoughts of welfare recipients. Hence in a 1995
case study of welfare recipients, Portland State University Professor Karen Seccombe
interviewed women on welfare to grand people insight on lives and thoughts of TANF
beneficiaries. Mothers on welfare knew that they are stereotyped as being lazy, unmotivated and
government swindlers. Similar to the opinion of the general public, these women also distrusted
other AFDC beneficiaries. Several of them admitted that they didn’t know anyone who
committed fraud or abuse personally, but stated that “there are a lot of people like that out
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there.”194 In accordance to a more conservative ideology, participants attributed other women’s
poverty and use of welfare to that person’s own “laziness, drug use, lack of human capital,
personal choice, other person shortcomings or irresponsible behavior.”195 These responses seem
to suggest that welfare mothers disassociated themselves from the stereotype but are willing to
believe that it applies to others in the group. This distrust among AFDC beneficiaries keeps the
community fractionalized and prevents the sort of movement to demand improvements to their
situation.
Dislike for Welfare Program
Welfare has always been a divisive issue in the United States. Even the New Deal, which
is now considered a historical piece of legislation, received strong opposition during the late
1930s in Capitol Hill and among the electorate.196 However, welfare program like pensions for
the elderly have not received the amount of animosity accorded to AFDC/TANF. In 2012, almost
70 percent of American believed that the government should be responsible for senior citizens.197
What is the difference between a people receiving a government check as a pension from Social
Security instead of TANF? Opponents may argue that these “Welfare Queens” do not deserve
their cash assistance since they have not worked, but based on the data previously presented, one
knows that welfare recipients are constantly participating in the labor force thereby contributing
to the benefits they are receiving. Although no one factor can be attributed as the reason for
public dislike of welfare programs, the belief that a recipient is lazy and would prefer to receive
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government aid than earn money through work plays a large role. This principle was at the
foundation of Reagan’s “Welfare Queen” and existed before it. In 1964, during the height of the
War on Poverty, 68 percent of Gallup survey respondents believed that most or some people in
welfare were there for dishonest reasons.198 The situation worsen by 1976, when 85 percent of
respondents agreed in a Harris Survey that “too many people” in welfare cheat by getting money
they are not entitled to.199 However, the question of why TANF beneficiaries are stigmatized
while recipients of other government programs are not remains.
A key difference between ADC/AFDC/TANF and other government programs is that the
former caters to many unpopular groups in society. For example, in the first half of the twentieth
century, ADC mainly benefited divorced, widowed, or unmarried women who had children, all
of whom were seen as unworthy of public funds. During the 1930s-1950s polls show that the
majority of Americans either did not believe in divorce or it should not be allowed in their
state.200201 A divorced woman receiving government funds would surely not receive much
sympathy from respondents. Similarly, towards the end of World War II, most people the United
States were unwilling to advocate for widowed mothers to receive their veteran husband’s
pension.202 Moreover, unmarried mothers were considered “jezebels” and unscrupulous for
bearing children when they were not in an official relationship. Welfare was seen as supporting
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people who were alleged violators of society’s mores. It is the association of the program with
these unpopular groups earned it a negative reputation.
As the program liberalized and started to accept new recipients, a new group of
“undesirables” entered the welfare rolls: African Americans. Countless sociologists such as
Williams Julius Wilson and Martin Gilens have posited that one of the major reasons for
animosity towards welfare by the general population is the overrepresentation of African
Americans in AFDC/TANF. Gilens states that “in a culture in which economic failure is often
attributed to lack of effort, blacks’ economic problems themselves reinforce the stereotype of
laziness.”203 In 1990, GSS respondents were 21 times more likely to believe that blacks lived off
welfare than whites and thereby reflecting Gilens’ claim204. As shown in previous polls, most
Americans are dismissive of economic situations, racism or other barriers that can limit upward
social mobility. Hence it is not surprising that many Americans see welfare as a program that is
being target by “lazy” blacks to take advantage of public funds.
Gilen also argues that the media has for many decades portrayed poverty in America as a
black problem. For example, an analysis of stories in Newsweek, Times and the US News &
World Report over four and a half decades (from 1950-1995) reports that over half of all pictures
depicting poverty are of African Americans even though this group only represent 29.3 percent
of the poor.205 Furthermore, Gilen concludes that providing the correct statistics will not be
enough to diminish American’s animosity towards welfare program. Both Wilson and he believe
that the best way to change public opinion is by lowering the number of African Americans in
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poverty.206 This creates a conundrum in which policymakers have to reduce poverty among
blacks to gain support for welfare programs overall.
Reaction to Welfare
Welfare Across Borders
It is no surprise that Americans have a significantly different relationship with their
government when compared to citizens in other countries, especially in welfare-friendly Europe.
The European Social Survey of 2010 determined that 88 percent of respondents thought that their
“government could do more to prevent people from falling into poverty.”207 That same year a
survey ran by the Kaiser Foundation, Harvard University, and the Washington Post found that
only 64 percent of Americans believed that there should be “more involvement” by the
government to reduce poverty.208 Similarly, when in 2012, Americans were asked to rank what
worries them the most about the national economy, unemployment and the national debt were
the two main worries while economic inequality ranked eighteen.209 The difference between
Europeans and Americans does not mean that one is better than the other, but it does highlight
the differences in political culture between the two regions and what they expect from their
respective governments. It also begins to explain why the United States has weaker social safety
nets than other comparable wealthy nations: Americans seem not to demand it as much.
What Americans believe about how government should use welfare to tackle poverty is
not only different from other nations but also differs across time. For example, The US News &
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World Report reported in 1996 that almost half of Americans believed that establishing a five
year time limit on welfare would in the long run help the children of welfare recipients.210
Likewise, when it comes to deciding what plays a bigger role in determining opportunities to
move ahead, people in the United State strongly supported “your own skill and hard work”
(41%) over “the state of the economy” (6%) and “current government policies” (5%).211
However, after the 2001-2002 recession, six in every ten individuals were willing to waive the
time limit due to the difficult economic times.212 In 2012, as the economy was still feeling the
repercussion of the Great Recession, 46 percent of people said that “circumstance,” not “lack of
effort” (38%), was the cause of poverty.213 The previous statements seem to indicate that people
in the United States are willing to admit that the culturally entrenched American Dream can be
limited by structural constraints. However, this sympathy seems to ebb as the economy recovers.
It is this deeply set belief that makes it difficult for politicians for gather enough support for to
improve welfare programs.
What is Not Welfare?
Republicans have often advocated for reducing the government’s deficit mainly, if not
exclusively, by decreasing spending while ignoring the possibility of reducing tax breaks. In
particular, TANF has constantly been faced with attempts of fiscal reduction. Republicans make
the assumption that governmental assistance in the form of TANF is trivial enough to shrink but
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fail to see how tax breaks are also a form of government aid. Tax reductions are not government
spending, but they are foregone revenue that could be used to pay for services or reduce the
deficit. Furthermore, tax breaks are in essence government “aid in the form of money” that is not
collected from household since policymakers have decided individuals are in “need” of it.
However, most conservatives do not categorize tax breaks as a form of welfare. An article in the
Wall Street Journal on March 2012 highlighted how the federal government sacrifices almost $1
trillion – approximately the size of its budget deficit – to provide these tax subsidies.214 The
federal government could easily afford paying for TANF by reducing tax breaks by less than 2
percent.
{FIGURE XIV: Top 10 Individual Tax Break for Fiscal Year
2014}

It is also important to note that many of these tax subsidies disproportionately benefit the
wealthier in society. For example, the mortgage-interest deduction, the third most generous tax
break in the chart above, fits the case. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities reported in
2012 that “more than half of federal spending on housing benefits households with incomes
above $100,000.”215 Overall, the government spends the same amount of fund subsidizing the
housing of the top 5 percent of income earner as it does in assisting public housing.216 Similarly,
the amount of tax revenue foregone to charity alone is over three times the amount allocated to
TANF.217 Defying conventional wisdom, just a small fraction of charity goes towards poverty

214

John D. McKinnon, Tax Breaks Exceed $1 Trillion: Report. Wall Street Journal. March 24, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303812904577299923495453562.html
215
Barbara Sard and Will Fischer, “Renters’ Tax Credit Would Promote Equity and Advance Balanced
Housing Policy,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. July 25, 2012.
216
Ibid.
217
McKinnon.

65
relief. In 2002, only two percent of donations went to social welfare and nine percent went to
human services.218
Although many individuals benefit from the $1 trillion of tax break, many do not believe
that they are accepting any type of government assistance. A recent study done by Cornell
University Professor Suzanne Mettler shows that 60 percent of people receiving home mortgage
interest deductions claim that they have not used a government social program.219 The same
applies for 53 percent governmental student loan recipients and 40 percent of Medicare users.
This societal perspective makes it easy to oppose welfare for the poor while supporting welfare
for the middle and upper class. The failure to classify the receipt of these benefits as a form of
welfare blinds society to the important role that policy has in assisting individual citizens. It also
promotes a double standard where providing government assistance for the poor creates
dependency while providing assistance to almost anyone else stimulates the economy.
Closing Remarks
Public opinion plays an essential role in the policymaking process. Failure of liberal
politicians to convince the electorate that welfare programs serve the public good as mentioned
in the OECD and NIH studies from the previous chapter has resulted in the continuous shrinking
of what used to be relatively successful poverty relief programs. Those who advocate for the
reduction of these services have succeed in narrowly defining welfare as a liability to society and
differentiating it from other government programs that also cater to public “need,” such as tax
breaks. Nevertheless, it is clear that Americans are willing to help the poor but the welfare
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stereotypes of laziness, dependency, and poor work ethic prevent them from supporting such
policies.
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Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations
Financing TANF
Coverage and Value
Since the creation of TANF in 1996 and its reauthorization in 2005, the United States has
experienced an increase in poverty while a continually decreasing number of TANF cases.
Although the existence of the five-year time limit has played a role, the states have been
incentivized by the federal structure of the block grant program to limit the number of cases they
have. As noted in Chapter 2, states can ameliorate their monetary sanctions or have the federal
government give them more funds if they are able to reduce their caseload. At the same time,
states do not want to hold cases for individuals who are difficult to employ since they prevent the
state from reaching the federal participation rate. Case reductions have often been achieved by
imposing harsh sanctions and changing eligibility guidelines rather than by improving the living
situation of TANF recipients. Therefore, a caseload decline provides a false sense of societal
improvement where it does not exist.
Ideally, the federal government would change the grant system into a matching program
through which it would pay for half of the state’s spending on TANF (the next subsection will
discuss how TANF has to be more narrowly tailored). By guaranteeing this breakdown in
expenditure the federal government would be paying proportionally less than it was during
AFDC and approximately the same as it is now.220 It would also grant states more flexibility as
promised in PRWORA and prevent negative incentives. The matching programs would liberate
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states from having to implement strict eligibility requirements and from the easier welfare cases
to guarantee adequate funding.
With greater flexibility states will be able to experiment with new ways to connect people
with opportunities to improve their socioeconomic situation. For example, the welfare-to-work
programs in Riverside County, California and Portland, Oregon are recognized to be among the
most successful in the country although the former places a greater emphasis on finding a job
first while the latter stresses the value of human capital.221 Similarly, Connecticut’s Step-Up
Program has been successful in subsidizing jobs in the state’s strong small business and
manufacturing base to decrease unemployment.222 Part of the variation in strategy but success of
these programs occurs because they are serving clients and sites with different characteristics and
have the flexibility to adapt to it. While HHS has recently began to grant participation-rate
waivers for very specific cases, new and innovative welfare programs might increase with less
restrictions.223
However, due to the current animosity towards welfare and the political polarization
described in Chapter 3, it would be difficult to pass such a drastic change. If the block grant
structure is unable to garner enough support, there should at least be a change in the language of
the bill to replace the “reduction of caseloads” requirement for a “reduction in unemployment” as
well as systematically adjust the value of TANF benefits for inflation. By holding states
accountable for the number of jobs gained by welfare recipients rather than how many of them
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are still on welfare, lawmakers and taxpayers will assess the effectiveness of TANF rather than
the creativity of administrators to adjust the rules of eligibility when it is advantageous. As the
past sixteen years show, caseload reduction has little societal value if poverty and unemployment
continuously increases among welfare recipients.
Similarly, by adjusting the value of benefits for inflation, the government will be
committing to helping those in need. If legislators wish to reduce the benefits available to
recipients, they will still have the option to do so legislatively. However, they will not be able to
clandestinely let inflation erode TANF value without feeling the political backlash of
continuously voting to decrease on poverty reduction programs. It would be appropriate for the
TANF benefits to be adjusted through the cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) in the same way
Social Security pensions have been since 1972.224 COLA is determined by the percentage
increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W)
from the third quarter of the last year a COLA was determined to the third quarter of the
current.225 Alternatively, TANF could use another version of the Consumer Price Index as
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Regardless of the index, inflation reduction will
prevent the thinning of American safety nets.
Supplemental Programs
While TANF assistance has been eroded through inflation and restricted through crafty
regulations, it has also been largely diverted to other programs. As mentioned in Chapter 2, cash
assistance has severely decreased since its high point in the late 1960s, and even since the
welfare reform was first passed. In 2011, only 29 percent of TANF funding went to cash
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assistance, compared to 71 percent in 1997.226 TANF funds are often used to support programs
such as childcare, refundable tax-credits for low income families, pregnancy prevention, twoparent family maintenance, and the administrative system needed to comply with new federal
regulations. Supplemental programs funded by TANF are important and often needed by low
income communities. However, these programs should not compete for funds with the essential
cash assistance meant for participants. For example, pregnancy prevention is a worthy goal to
follow which avoids unwanted children during an individual’s prime years of education or work.
Nevertheless, having more pregnancy prevention does not cloth, feed, or provide shelter for
those who are already in poverty (with or without children). Congress ought to segregate the
amount of funds appropriated for cash assistance to TANF recipients from all the other
programs, thereby narrowly tailoring the legislation and preventing unintended earmarks. TANF
cash assistance should not be part of a zero-sum system with other social services the same way
Social Security pensions are not contingent on other programs for the elderly, such as Medicare.
New legislation could keep supplemental programs under the administration of TANF but
Congress, rather than the states, should determine the percentage of the grant used for cash
assistance.
Contingency Fund
Although Congress should separate the supplemental programs from TANF cash
assistance, it should also better integrate and improve the Emergency Contingency Fund.
Historically, AFDC cases and spending always increased during and after economic recessions
and decreased as the economy recovered. However, welfare reform has decoupled this
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relationship. From its 1996 inception, Congress knew that the Fund would not be able to
properly support an economic downturn. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the current level of the
Fund could only support one-third of what was needed for the AFDC expansion during the
relatively mild 1991 recession. The 2001 recession did not have much impact on TANF because
the cases gained due to the recession were mainly offset by the cases lost from the maturing 1996
reform, resulting in the number of TANF cases decreasing during this period but at lower rate.
The strength of the Fund was truly tested during the economic crisis that started in 2007 but the
effects of which are still felt at the time of this writing. Some of the earlier repercussions were
ameliorated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that did a one-time appropriation
of $5 billion for FY 2009 and FY 2010.227 Nevertheless, states were forced to slash TANF
assistance once the fund ran out, even though unemployment was still high and the economy had
not returned to pre-recession levels.
Lawmakers ought to make the TANF caseload sensitive to economic indicators, such as
unemployment and poverty rate during a crisis. They should pass legislation committing the
federal government to increase emergency funding by the percentage change of prospective
TANF recipients. Therefore, if a recession is expected to increase the number of potential
applicants by 10% then the federal government will increase TANF appropriation through the
Emergency Contingency Fund by 10%. This number could be calculated by the Congressional
Budget Office and based on the eligibility requirements in each state on the year before the
recession. They would continue this strategy until the economy returns to full employment. This
proposal makes the concession that full employment for the country will be reached before low-
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income members achieve full-employment since unemployment has constantly been higher
among low income communities.228
PRWORA Requirements
Time Limit
The creation of time limits for TANF was one of the most widely contested areas of
welfare reform. It was meant to prevent an unlimited “dependency” on government assistance.
However, data shows that the time limit has had marginal effects. Only 1.3 percent of case
closures are due to the federal time limit and the average length of TANF that a family receives
assistance is of 35.4 months (almost half of the 60 month time limit).229 Due to the small number
of people that are affected by this piece of legislation, the Department of Health and Human
Services should study the demographics of this group and why they reach their TANF lifetime
limit when so many do not. HHS must also look at those recipients in states that have a time limit
that is below the federal one.230
The investigation will most likely find that this small fraction of welfare recipients face
some of the most severe barriers to employment such as work-limiting health conditions, poor
mental/emotional health, and domestic violence (some may have multiple). Previous studies
have demonstrated that most TANF recipients have at least one barrier of employment, therefore
it can be logical to conclude that this 1.3 percent would have the hardest time overcoming these
barriers.231 Based on the finding of the HHS, each state should work with the federal government
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to either help people overcome the barriers or lower the barriers to begin with. While some may
argue that individuals should overcome barriers on their own, the history of the United States
shows that the government has always helped individuals help themselves. In the first sentence
of the Preamble to the United States Constitution, government is held responsible for promoting
“the general welfare.” Similarly, legislation such as the Homestead Act of 1862232, the GI Bill of
1944233, and all of the current tax exemption are clear examples that the United States
government constantly supported it citizens. There is the possibility that those whose cases are
closed due to the time limit are simply waiting to extract as much government assistance as
possible before having to work. In any case, the HHS should observe what welfare recipients
who exhaust their allotted 60 months do after they are cut off. If findings support the Welfare
Queen stereotype, then the policy would be validated.
Job Requirement
Similar to the time-limit, the job requirement is meant to prevent TANF recipients from
becoming perpetually reliant on government aid. It follows the Victorian distinction between the
“unworthy” poor who are able-bodied and the “worthy” poor. However, it is important to
consider that being willing to work is significantly different from having the opportunity to
work. The 2008 financial crisis has highlighted the fundamental issue with having a job
requirement for TANF: there are too many people seeking too few jobs. To further exasperate
the situation, people who need to find a position to receive TANF assistances typically have a
low level of educational attainment and the data shows that unemployment rates are almost twice
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as high for individuals who have not finished high school.234 In previous decades, these
individuals could have worked in the manufacturing industry for an adequate salary, but as noted
in Chapter 2, those jobs are now scarce. Moreover, almost half of all unemployed at this time
have been without a job for more than six months, a calculation which does not consider
discouraged workers.235 The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reports that job-prospects
are at their lowest for those who have been unemployed for three months or more.236
Furthermore, the Congressional Budget Office has already extrapolated that the economy will
not return to full employment until at least 2018.237
Based on the current economic situations Congress should wave the work requirement
temporarily, provide subsidized jobs, or do a combination of both. It is not realistic to ask for
those in society who have the least training and most employment barriers to find positions in the
worst crisis since the Great Depression. Lawmakers could ease worries of dependency by
temporarily eliminating the time limit that searching for a job counts towards the work
requirement. In essence, people who are looking for a job will be able to receive TANF benefits.
While some will worry that recipients will pretend to look for jobs but be unwilling to work,
most research presented in the previous chapters has demonstrated that people are willing to
work when given the chance. At the same time, in accordance with welfare-to-work ideology,
lawmakers can add resources to the Emergency Contingency Fund that can be used by states to
provide subsidized employment until the economy returns to full employment. Through a
subsidized employment program the government will be receiving some of its spending back in
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the form of taxes and workers will not have their skills eroded by experiencing longer periods of
unemployment. While subsidized employment programs have proven relatively unsuccessful in
alleviating unemployment among welfare recipients during normal economic periods, there is the
possibility that the program will be more effective with individuals who were in the labor force
until the recession.
Hopefully, this national experience with systematic and structural unemployment will
lead lawmakers and the electorate to realize that welfare recipients who are unemployed are not
necessarily so by choice. A highlighted by Chapter 3, an increase in empathy with welfare
recipients does occur during recessionary periods, but it quickly fades away. While the political
climate will not allow for the permanent elimination of the job requirement, the willingness of
the Obama administration to grant job-requirements waivers to states that are seeking to increase
employment among TANF beneficiaries is a positive step in the right direction. This policy
allows each region to tailor employment programs to fit the needs of the local industry without
having to worry about their funding being limited if the state does not meet the participation rate.
The federal and state governments must use the diversity of industries in the United States to
allocate the labor force appropriately rather than forcing the same techniques on high-tech
California and tourist-oriented Florida. At the same time, the elimination of time limits for which
a recipient can search for a job without being penalized as well as the dissolution on limits of
how many people can participate in each of the twelve work categories will give states the
flexibility to discover how they can increase employment in this community. All levels of
government should learn from the unsuccessful experience of reducing poverty through strict job
requirements, and create new possibilities.
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Fraud Prevention
As noted in Chapter 3, most people in the United States are willing to assist the poor but
hesitate to support welfare programs such as TANF. Chapter 3 also explained that some of the
worries about TANF recipients swindling the government are established on exaggerated
stereotypes that have been passed from one generation to the next since the inception of the
program. Nevertheless, the Office of the Inspector General determined that in the mid-2000s
before the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) New York, Michigan and Ohio had
high rate of overpayments and underpayments.238 Unfortunately, there have not been recurring
investigations to update the fraud rate in individual states.
The federal and state governments can do more to assure that TANF funds are properly
allocated to people who need them rather than those who are trying to collect extra income.
However, we must take into consideration that even the most popular government programs are
affected by error and fraud, but their eradication is not demanded nor are their participants
stigmatized as in the case of TANF. For example, HHS determined that in 2011 there had been
more than $64 billion in improper payments with the Medicare and Medicaid system; an amount
over three times the size of the overall federal budget for TANF. Similarly, it is estimate that in
2010, $305 billion dollars were lost due to tax evasion.239 In the short-run, it would probably be
more economical for regulatory agencies to prosecute medical providers and large tax evaders
who are defrauding the government than TANF recipients. While the integrity of TANF should
be protected, lawmakers must also calculate what is in public interest when it comes to pursuing
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fraud. Overall, asking for the dissolution of TANF because of fraud would be like having a
school close its doors because some students cheated on their homework.
If lawmakers believe that TANF fraud should be a political priority or have been able to
minimize improper payments in other areas, they should use many of the modern financial
devices to make sure that welfare dollars are allocated to the needy. For the most part, people
who take a few hundreds or thousands of cash assistance in TANF are not going to be using
Swiss banks or be wiring money to islands in the Caribbean. Therefore, as suggested by the
Inspector General, fraud could be severely reduced by a more thorough examination of the
documents presented by TANF applicants.240 Congress could also pass legislation to ease the
process by which TANF fraud inspectors, not caseworkers, can access financial records to TANF
recipients. In a computerize age, there is reason why a HHS cannot collaborate with the Internal
Revenue Service and a private bank to determine the financial movements of a person who has
been reasonably accused of defrauding the program.241
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Conclusion
The previous four chapters have analyzed the rise and fall of AFDC/TANF and proposed
ways to improve it. Failure to do so will surely lead to a further deterioration of living standards
among low-income communities in the United States. The proposed reform is not ideological but
rather a mere reaction to changes in the labor force that have appeared as consequence of
economic progress and free market strategies.
Since the inception of this welfare program, opponents have repeatedly imposed
restrictions in the hopes of preventing an alleged “culture of poverty” and dependency. However,
these changes have had either a negative effect, such as increasing poverty, or none at all. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act promised to usher
AFDC/TANF recipients out of the program by establishing a time limit and enforcing a work
requirement. Although the number of cases has decreased, the poverty rates remain at an all-time
high, even if one excludes the effects of the Great Recession. Although the shift from a
manufacturing to a service-oriented economy is partly responsible for this, federal and state
governments have done little to ameliorate the situation. The United States has mainly followed
a conservative strategy to eliminate poverty for over fifteen years and it has resulted in a worse
situation. As previously mentioned, studies have shown that even the positive effects of the
welfare reform’s early years can be largely attributed to a strong economy and other reforms.
Research has also proven that there is no conclusive evidence (domestically or internationally)
that welfare programs hinder economic growth.
It is time for policymakers to face the country’s socioeconomic situation not necessarily
as a matter of ethics or charity but because individuals need these programs to improve their
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living standards, thereby enhancing the overall economy as mentioned in Chapter 1. At the same
time, people who use AFDC/TANF on average find a job and exit the program within the first
three years. Welfare recipients use these programs as stepping stones to success rather than to
live a comfortable work-free life. While Chapter 4 recommends a study be conducted to learn
why a small percentage of individuals remain part of the program for longer periods of time, at
this point there is not conclusive data on the subject. In the US, where success is believed to be
strongly linked with hard work, poverty becomes an indicator of a deficient work ethic rather
than the result of multiple social factors. However, research has noted the multiple barriers to
employment that recipients face that prevent them from improving their situation. The Great
Recession has also highlighted the reality of structural unemployment and the fact that too many
people can be pursuing too few jobs.
Based on the evidence of the past four chapters it is clear that policymakers must act now
or expect to make a larger investment in the future as low-income communities continue to fall
behind their wealthier counterparts. AFDC/TANF is no longer having the positive societal
effects it had during most of the twentieth century due to the legislative restriction currently in
place. Americans are in need of a new deal that will reestablish the supporting relationship
between government and citizens needed for a thriving economy and cohesive society.
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Appendix A
FIGURE I: AFDC MONTHLY BENEFITS PER FAMILY
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FIGURE II: BIRTH RATES FOR WOMEN AGES 15-19 FROM 1940-2010

Source of Graph: Center for Disease Control – National Vital Statistics System
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FIGURE III: NUMBER OF AFDC/TANF FAMILIES BY RACE

Source of Graph: U.S Department of Health and Human Services

FIGURE IV: TOTAL TIME IN AFDC 1979-1994
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FIGURE V: DECLINE IN AFDC/TANF CASELOAD EVEN WHEN POVERTY INCREASES

Source of Graph: Center of Budget and Policy Priorities

FIGURE VI: CORPORATE PROFIT/GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
0.12

Bil. Of $/Bil. Of $

0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00

Years

Source of Data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

83
FIGURE VII: WAGES & SALARY ACCRUALS/GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
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FIGURE VIII: CHANGE IN WAGES OVER TIME

Source of Graph: Institute of Economic Policy
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FIGURE IX: EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIO

Source of Graph: Bureau of Labor Statistics

FIGURE X: TAND FAMILIES BY REASON FOR CLOSURE FY 2010
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FIGURE XI: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE
RECIPIENT AND THE POOR
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FIGURE XII: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE RECIPIENTS
BASED ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION
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FIGURE XIII: CHANGES IN THE “TEMPERATURE” TOWARDS WELFARE RECIPIENTS
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FIGURE XIV: Top 10 Individual Tax Break for Fiscal Year 2014
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